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22 June 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In response to your recent request, attached is a memorandum which the Secretary of Defense, with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Joint Staff, has written on the relative US and Soviet military buildups since January 1961, and on the probable effect of these relative buildups on Soviet attitudes toward the Berlin situation during the months ahead.

Secretary McNamara's covering memorandum concludes, on balance, that the relative improvement has been in our favor. It also concludes that, for reasons which include the US military buildup, the Soviets during the months ahead, although maintaining a rigid position in negotiations on Berlin, will not make any serious move to break them off.

There is only one point which I would call to your attention. When we complete the release of the reserve units later this summer, our overall military strength figure will fall by about 150,000 -- from the 2,825,000 which is shown on the last line of Secretary McNamara's first page to around 2,680,000. This will represent the loss, among other things, of two Army divisions, some tactical air fighters, and some naval units. Whether these reductions are to be permanent presumably will be considered in Secretary McNamara's current study on general purpose forces.

You may wish to refer this paper to State for comment.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

#1 copy - Pres.

Attachment - #2 - B.Smith

bcc: Mr. Bromley Smith

Major Smith

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

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21 JUN 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US and Soviet Military Buildup and Probable Effects on Berlin Situation

REFERENCE: General Taylor's Memorandum of 14 June to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Acting Director Central Intelligence

General Taylor's memorandum asked for a comparison of the military buildup of Soviet forces with that of United States forces over the past eighteen months and for our views of the probable effect of the current relative strengths on Soviet attitudes toward the Berlin situation in the coming months. I shall treat these as two separate but related subjects in this report which has been prepared with the assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency and has the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Joint Staff.

Forces Buildup

The size and composition of the USSR's military forces have been influenced importantly by Soviet policy decisions of the past year and a half, in which the Berlin crisis has been an important factor. A programmed reduction in military manpower and in older air and naval equipment was underway in 1960 and had cut total military strength to 3,000,000 men in the first part of 1961. In response to our reaction to the Berlin pressures, the process was reversed in the summer of 1961 by calling some key reserves and delaying the discharge of conscripts in the Fall of 1961. We believe that the force level now stands at about 3.25 to 3.5 million men. The increase in personnel strength seems to have been used to bring existing units up to strength and provide needed combat and service support units rather than to raise the number of divisions. We believe Soviet Army strength is now approximately 145 divisions, of which 79 are at 70% or higher strength and have an immediate combat capability. The remaining 66 vary in strength and training status but are essentially cadre units of 40% or less strength.

During the same period the United States armed forces have been increased by 325,000 to 2,825,000. More significant

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than the number is the form which our buildup has taken. We have made a major increase in operational missiles, both tactical and strategic. We have filled out skeleton combat units, relieved tactical forces of basic training missions, added needed support units, reequipped with modern weapons, increased mobility, improved the alert status of both strategic and tactical forces, eliminated critical shortages of equipment, and raised forward stockage levels -- in sum, we have put our forces on an increased war readiness basis.

It is difficult to be precise in cataloging specific measures taken by the Soviets and particularly in determining the timing of their moves. However, the Soviets have made important qualitative improvements, notably in mechanizing their ground forces, adding to their formidable submarine fleet, and in expanding their strategic nuclear capabilities. Soviet missile capabilities for nuclear delivery and air defense have continued to increase in the past 13 months, and the tempo of the ICBM program has quickened. At present, the USSR possesses a ballistic missile force capable of delivering massive nuclear attacks against targets in the European area, and a much more limited force of missiles and bombers suitable for attacking the United States.

In sum, we believe that the measures it has adopted since 1 January 1961 mean that the USSR is now retaining ground, air, and naval forces at levels higher than originally planned, while at the same time proceeding with an expansion of capabilities with advanced weapon systems. But, on balance, we believe there is no question that the relative improvement has been in our favor and that the Soviet leadership knows it. I have attached to this report two annexes, one showing, for both sides, strengths and changes in personnel and in key organizations and weapons and another describing measures taken to improve combat readiness in critical categories.

Implications for Berlin

With reference to Berlin, I feel certain that our improved military position and our firm response to provocation have had a major influence on Soviet attitudes. From the beginning Khrushchev has sought to develop his campaign against Berlin in such a way as to avoid serious risk of general war. At the same time, he evidently believed that Allied concern over a military confrontation would lead the West to compromise its position in Berlin.

While the Soviet leadership has received a firmer reaction than expected from the West, it has been beset with mounting

internal and intra-Bloc problems. In the wake of the October Party Congress, the Kremlin has had to deal with problems raised by the renewed attack on Stalin and the anti-Party group and with a widening rift in its relations with Peking and Tirana. Another factor that may be inducing caution is the status of the East German regime which continues to be plagued with economic problems and a resentful, hostile population. It is a singularly unstable Satellite upon which to base a major political issue. The Soviets also apparently intend to continue their efforts to woo West Germany, as a possible alternative to negotiating with the Allied Powers and as a device for driving a wedge between Bonn and its NATO partners.

Another important factor which contributes to the USSR's hesitancy in pushing its Berlin objectives by precipitate action is that the Soviet leaders appear now to realize that the shift in the political-military relation of forces in the world has been less significant than they anticipated two or three years ago. The United States acceleration of military programs beginning in 1961 has clearly impressed them as a manifestation of United States determination and has also forced them to confront the economic implications of a new round of arms competition. At the same time, they have had to recognize that the West cannot be persuaded to accept their inflated strategic claims. Perhaps equally important, they have become aware that their real accomplishments in strategic weapons cannot be so readily translated into concessions by the West as they had earlier imagined.

Signed
ROBERT S. McNAMARA
Secretary of Defense

2 Annexes:

- 1 - Comparative Data Soviet-US
Forces 1 Jan 61 - 1 Jul 62**
- 2 - Major Measures Taken to
Improve Readiness of
Soviet-US Forces**

ANNEX 1

COMPARATIVE DATA SOVIET-US FORCES
1 JAN 61 - 1 JUL 62

Personnel Strengths

	<u>1 Jan 61</u>	<u>1 Jul 62</u>	<u>Change</u>
Soviet	3,000,000	3,250,000 to 3,500,000	+250,000 to 500,000
U.S.	2,500,000	2,825,000	+325,000

Ground Forces

Soviet Divisions

Rifle	42	0	- 42
Motorized/Mechanized	82	105	+ 23
Tank	26	33	+ 7
Airborne	8	7	- 1
Total	<u>158</u>	<u>145</u>	<u>- 13</u>

U.S. Divisions

Infantry	9	10	+ 1
Mechanized	0	2	+ 2
Armored	3	4	+ 2
Airborne	2	2	0
(Marine) 1/	3	3	0
Total	<u>17</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>+ 5</u>

Armored Cav Regt	6	7	+ 1
Separate Battle Group	8	9	+ 1
Separate Tank Battalion	9	12	+ 3
Separate Combat Command	1	0	- 1

Air Forces

Soviet Aircraft

Fighter	6,550	6,670	+ 120
Light Bomber	825	550	- 275
Medium Bomber	1,400	1,310	- 90
Heavy Bomber/Tanker 2/	150	160	+ 10

U.S. Aircraft

Fighter-Interceptor	1,139	1,305	+ 166
Tactical Fighter	1,117	1,697	+ 580
Medium Bomber	1,102	968	- 134
Heavy Bomber	504	595	+ 91
Light Bomber	181	84	- 97

1/ Also listed under Naval Forces
 2/ USAF estimates 200

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1 Jan 61Jul 62ChangeNaval Forces

Soviet Surface Ships

First Line

OCA(Old Class Heavy Cruiser)	3	0	- 3
CLG(Guided Missile Light Cruiser)	0	2	+ 2
CL (Light Cruiser)	18	15	- 3
DDG(Guided Missile Destroyer)	10	14	+ 4
DD (Destroyer)	85	90	+ 5
ODD(Old Class Destroyer)	9	0	- 9
DE (Destroyer Escort)	66	66	None

Second Line

OCA(Old Class Heavy Cruiser)	1	4	+ 3
CL (Guided Missile Light Cruiser)	1	0	- 1
DD (Destroyer)	16	0	- 16
ODD(Old Class Destroyer)	6	3	- 3

Soviet Submarines

First Line

Long Range, Snorkel (Z, F)	34	40	+ 6
Long Range, Snorkel (W, R)	220	208	- 12
Medium Range	30	30	None
Short Range	48	46	- 2
Nuclear Prop Torpedo SSN	3	4	+ 1

Second Line

Long Range	33	8	- 25
Medium Range	10	0	- 10
Short Range	17	0	- 17

(See Missile Section for
Missile Launching Submarines)

U.S. Surface Ships

Attack Aircraft Carriers	14	16	+ 2
ASW Support Carriers	9	10	+ 1
Cruisers	14	13	- 1
Destroyers	107	107	0
Patrol Ships	45	70	+ 25
Command Ships (CC)	1	1	0
Mine Warfare Ships	82	84	+ 2
Amphibious Warfare Ships	112	130	+ 18

	<u>1 Jan 61</u>	<u>1 Jul 62</u>	<u>Change</u>
U.S. Surface Ships (Cont'd)			
Carrier Air Groups (CVG) (64-88 a/c ea)	14	16	+ 2
Carrier ASW Air Groups (Anti-sub Warfare) (CVSG) (36-40 a/c ea)	9	10	+ 1
Air ASW Rons (VS) (Shorebased) (10 a/c ea)	-	13	+ 13
Air ASW Rons (VP) (12-15 a/c ea)	30	35	+ 5
AEW Ron (VW) (7-25 a/c ea)	5	5	0
U.S. Submarines			
Submarines	107	107	0
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSB(N))	3	9	+ 6
U.S. Marines			
Fleet Marine Force	2	2	0
Marine Div/Wing Team	3	3	0

Missiles

Soviet Missiles 1/ (On Launchers)

SAM (Surface to Air Missile)			
SA1	3,360	3,360	None
SA2	2,400	3,000	+ 600
SA3	None	300-400	+ 300-400
ICBM			
SS-6 & SS-7 (Surface to Surface)	5 - 10	About 50	+ 40
M/IRBM			
SS-3, SS-4, SS-5	About 300	About 525 2/	+ 225
Short Range			
SS-1 and SS-2	240	240	None

	<u>1 Jan 61</u> <u>Subs/MsIs</u>	<u>1 Jul 62</u> <u>Subs/MsIs</u>	<u>Change</u> <u>Subs/MsIs</u>
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Soviet Missiles (Cont'd)

Sub-launched 3/

"Z-Conversion" Conventional-			
350 nm Ballistic	7/14	7/14	None
"G" Class Conventional-			
350 nm Ballistic	18/54	21/63	3/9
"H" Class Nuclear -			
350 nm Ballistic	-	10/30	10/30
"E" Class Nuclear- 350 nm			
Cruise Missile	-	4/24	4/24
"W-Conversion" Conventional-			
350 nm Cruise Missile	-	5/13	5/13

- 1/ Soviet operational doctrine provides for a refire capability from all SSM launchers. Figures (with the exception of SS-1 and SS-2 and sub-launched) are estimated on-launcher missiles, and not the total available inventory.
- 2/ This figure may include alternate and/or possibly some decoy launch sites or complexes.
- 3/ A new ballistic missile system for submerged launch is believed to be under development and test with a range of at least 650 nm, and possibly 2,000 nm. It is not expected to be operationally deployed in the Mid-62 time period.

U.S. Missiles (On Launchers)

SAM

Nike Ajax	6104	6369	/ 265
Terrier	669	1211	/ 542
Nike Hercules	2601	3237	/ 636
Talos	80	185	/ 105
Hawk	407	2277	/ 1870
Tartar	0	222	/ 222

ICBM

Atlas	12	76	/ 64
Titan	0	48	/ 48

M/IRBM

Thor (UK)	60	60	None
Jupiter (Italy)	30	30	None
Jupiter (Turkey)	9	15	/ 6

	<u>1 Jan 61</u>	<u>1 Jul 62</u>	<u>Change</u>
U.S. Missiles (Cont'd)			
Short Range			
MACE	0	64	+ 64
MATADOR	80	0	- 80
REDSTONE	37	28	- 9
CORPORAL	418	286	- 132
Sub-Launched			
POLARIS	16	96	+ 80

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MAJOR MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE
READINESS OF SOVIET-US FORCES

ANNEX 2

PERSONNEL

Soviet

The size and composition of the USSR's military forces have been influenced importantly by Soviet policy decisions of the past year and a half, in which the Berlin issue has been an important factor. A programmed reduction in military manpower and in older air and naval equipment was underway in 1960 and the first part of 1961. This reduction was halted in the spring of 1961 and total Soviet military strength stood at approximately three million men. This reflected the completion of about one half of the originally announced cut. In the summer and fall the Soviet Government announced that it had suspended further reductions and would retain certain conscripts and selected reservists were recalled to active duty. By 1 January 1962 Soviet military strength was approximately 3 1/2 million men. We believe that this change in policy resulted in part from the Berlin issue and in part from a revised Soviet view of the size of theater and other forces needed in the event of war. The total of 3 1/4 to 3 1/2 million shown for 1 July 1962 includes 250,000 to 500,000 military personnel retained or recalled as a result of the Berlin issue. Because information on the manning of Soviet military units accumulates piecemeal over an extended period no breakout of these additional personnel by component strength is given. However, we believe the primary effect has almost certainly been on ground elements of the theater field forces. This increase is believed to have been partly counteracted by the release of some conscripts and reservists in early spring 1962. It is not possible at this time to determine the number released. Meanwhile, higher manning levels and the retention of trained personnel contribute to increased combat readiness of Soviet forces.

US

The greatest strength increase took place in the Army which was met by ordering reserve and National Guard personnel to duty (46,000), ordering the two National Guard divisions to active duty (73,000) and increasing the monthly draft quotas (87,000). The Navy recalled relatively few reserves and achieved its personnel buildup through enlistments and re-enlistments

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as did the Marine Corps. Of the Air Force increase, some 44% were reserve and National Guard components ordered to active duty with the remainder added by normal enlistment or re-enlistments. All Services extended terms of service of some personnel. The 325,000 total increase is distributed as follows: Army 211,000, Air Force 65,000, Navy 35,000 and Marines 15,000.

BUDGET

Soviet

In late 1960 the Soviets announced that planned expenditures (i.e., cash outlays) for defense as defined in the Soviet budget, in 1961 would decrease from their 1960 level of 9.6 to 9.3 billion rubles. Since that time they have announced an increase of 3.1 billion rubles for 1961 and a further increase of 1 billion rubles for 1962, for a combined total increase of about 40% over 1960. For the same two-year time period, Soviet expenditures for scientific research institutions, which include much military research and development, were slated to increase 1 billion rubles or about one-third. Thus, the announcements suggest an increase in Soviet military expenditures of something approaching 4.5-5 billion rubles over 1960. There is reason to believe that these increases are in part the result of bookkeeping transfers, inspired by the desire to make propaganda and in part by the desire to regularize budgetary practices perhaps in preparation for disarmament talks.

Estimated Actual Expenditures

However, because of the halting of the demobilization of military manpower and the continuing Soviet programs for nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and MR/IRBM and ICBM programs, it is estimated 1962 Soviet military expenditures will actually increase about 2 or perhaps 2 1/2 billion rubles, or about 15-20 percent over the 1960 estimated level of some 14-15 billion rubles. It is currently calculated that as much as one-half of this increase is being devoted to Soviet capabilities for strategic attack, somewhat less to the air defense mission, and the remainder to Soviet general purpose forces.

US

The original FY 62 budget request was for \$41.809 billion. Since January 1961 approximately 6 billion have been added resulting in a revised FY 62 estimate of \$47.506 billion - an increase of about 14%. This increase was achieved through 5

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amendments and supplemental requests. The largest amendment, \$3.4 billion, was effected on 26 July 1961 and was based on the deteriorating Berlin situation. The other increases related to additional flexibility in limited non-nuclear conflict and unconventional warfare and a wide range of quality improvements in the existing forces.

ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

Soviet

Ground:

Soviet line divisions are now organized into two basic line divisions, the motorized rifle and tank division (the airborne division is essentially the same as the motorized rifle division less non-air transportable equipment). Line divisions are organized into two types of armies - combined arms and tanks. The combined arms army normally has 4 motorized rifle divisions and 1 tank division and the tank army 4 tank divisions. The corps echelon has virtually disappeared from the peacetime organization, although it is still mentioned in Soviet tactical doctrine. The number of conventional field artillery and anti-aircraft units has been reduced and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile units have been phased into the Ground Force organization.

Air:

A fundamental change in the tactical bombardment functions is indicated by the release of all medium bombers and a rapid phasing out of light bombers from Tactical Aviation. Tactical bombardment is to be accomplished by fighters and fighter-bomber aircraft. Air defense fighters have been removed from Naval Aviation and are now under the control of the IA-PVO.

US

The Army has expedited its reorganization program and is beginning the organization of the new RODA divisions. This organization will permit varying mixes of combat maneuver battalions on a common basic division structure. This offers the advantage of being able to tailor the combat forces to mission or terrain. USSTRICOM has been activated and is responsible for the joint training of CONUS based Army and Air Force combat ready forces. Within existing Air Force resources, the 1st Air Command Group and the Special Air Warfare

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Center were organized to specifically meet counterinsurgency situations, including South Vietnam. US air units in Southeast Asia were reorganized to provide for more responsive and effective application of US and indigenous air power. Air Force communications units were integrated under the new Air Force Communications Services to provide improved control. The 9th Aerospace Division was organized in ADC to provide effective integration of advanced warning, weapon and control aerospace defense systems. As a result of the strength increase, the Marines have formed the following additional units: One Marine air group, one medium helicopter squadron, one heavy artillery battery (HJ), and three cadre infantry battalions brought up to full strength.

WEAPONS

Soviet

Army:

There is relatively little information on major Soviet developments and programs in the non-nuclear field. Western observers have noted new and advanced designs in practically all types of military equipment. Such observations include tanks, armored personnel carriers, free rockets, anti-aircraft, and anti-tank weapons.

Air:

The BLINDER supersonic dash medium bomber has been introduced into Long Range Air units in small numbers. The fighter-bomber FIREBAR is also starting to appear in Tactical Aviation units. This constitutes a major change in the bombing concepts for Tactical Aviation inasmuch as all medium bombers have been transferred from Tactical Aviation and the light bombers are being rapidly phased out. High performance fighters (FITTER & FISHBED) are entering the inventory in increasing numbers. Phase out of the MIG-15 is to all intents and purposes complete, and replacement of the MIG-17 is now underway.

Navy:

Naval weapons systems appearing since January 1961 show an increasing naval interest in missile armament. Long range, nuclear propelled submarines with surface launch, 350 nm ballistic missiles, suitable for strategic attack have been observed, and

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there is evidence that the Soviets are developing an underwater launch capability. In addition, conventional and nuclear propelled submarines with 350 nm cruise missiles, have appeared, and short range surface-to-surface missiles have been installed on cruisers, destroyers and guided missile patrol boats. A recent development indicates that the Soviets have installed surface-to-air missiles on a cruiser and destroyer. The successful development of a shipborne surface-to-air capability would allow Soviet surface ships to operate beyond their present range which is now limited by the radius of shore-based air cover. In naval aviation a significant development has been the installation of air-to-surface missiles (AS-2) on BADGER medium bombers. The turboprop seaplane which appeared in the 1961 Moscow Air Show suggests the Soviets may be commencing a program to modernize their obsolescent and relatively small force of ASW patrol aircraft. For ASW, the Soviets have constructed ASW ships of the small coastal types and have equipped some of their destroyers and many smaller surface ships with multiple tube ASW rocket launchers, as well as improved detection equipment. As a result their in-shore ASW capability has become fairly effective.

US

Major improvements were made by the Army in fire power, mobility, air defense, communications, combat support and logistic support. Specifically, the M-14 rifle, the M-60 tank, the M-67 recoilless rifle and the M-113 Army personnel carrier were issued to troops. Navy phased in increased numbers of new carrier based and land based aircraft including helicopters, and increased test and development of other types commensurate with additional funds provided in the Berlin add-on. Additional nuclear submarines and ships are shown in the Annex 1. Two new types of aircraft (B-58 and F-105) became operational. The Marines equipped three squadrons with the GV1 which is an aerial refueler transport version of the C-130 and introduced into their inventory the F-4-H. Also being issued to the Marine Corps is the 7.62 NATO family of weapons.

MISSILES

Soviet

SAM:

The SA-1 is the first Soviet operational system, deployed only in defense of Moscow.

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The follow-on SA-2 system does not appear to be designed to cope with low level attacks. It is estimated as effective from about 2,500 to 60,000 feet with some capability up to about 80,000 feet.

The SA-3, first became operational in 1961. It is estimated to be a low altitude system with possible minimum altitude capability of 50 feet at a range not exceeding 10 nautical miles.

The SA-4 (Not listed in Annex 1) is an anti-ballistic missile system in the development stage with initial deployment now possibly underway.

ICBM:

The SS-6 was the first deployed ICBM with an initial operational capability of early 1960. Only a small number of these missiles are believed to have been deployed.

The bulk of the force consists of the 2nd generation SS-7 with an initial operational capability in the first half of 1962.

I/MRBM

The bulk of this force is deployed in western USSR within range of NATO targets in Europe, a few sites are located in the southern USSR, and in the Far East.

About 25 SS-5 (2,200 nm range) are estimated to be deployed in mid-1962 as against none in 1 January 1961.

US

The US Army has been coordinating engineer, service, and troop testing of the family of missiles included in the Army program. Navy completed tests of the Polaris A-2 missile and the first A-2 equipped SSBN is ready for deployment. A full scale test of the A-1 Polaris weapon system was conducted during the present nuclear test series, as was a test of ASROC, a recently developed ASW nuclear weapon system. There was an increase of approximately 112 ICBMs during the period. The MACE tactical missile became operational. One Marine Territorial Battalion was re-equipped with the Hawk missile.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Soviet

In 1961 the USSR resumed nuclear testing. The series included tests of stockpiled weapons and devices which could enter the stockpile in the near future. However, it is estimated that the present Soviet stockpile consists almost entirely of weapons developed from nuclear tests conducted prior to 1961. Some new weapons tested in 1961 could be available for operational use, but in general, these will not enter the Soviet stockpile in significant numbers until after mid-1962. The Soviets tested a device yielding in excess of 50 MT but it is unlikely that more than a few weapons of this type will be introduced. At present it could be delivered intercontinentally only by Long Range Aviation.

US

Nuclear weapon delivery capability has been augmented and improved throughout the armed forces. Davy Crockett launchers have been deployed to Europe.

The authorization for Polaris submarines has been increased from 14 to 19, while the number deployed has been increased from 1 to 6. In the strategic air field: 6 B-47 wings scheduled for phase-out were retained in the inventory; the ratio of aircraft on ground alert was increased from 33-1/3% to 50%; 23 squadrons of B-52s have been equipped with GAM 77s; Jupiter missiles have been deployed to Turkey.

, and Project Chrome Dome was implemented. A new series of vital nuclear weapons testing has been initiated.

LOGISTICS

Soviet

Stocks of POL and ammunition indicate that a sustained campaign can be supported in the Central European region. There is sufficient POL now in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia for about 67 days of combat by 60 divisions and supporting units and enough ammunition for 57 days of combat by the same force. Missiles, missile fuels, and warheads are believed to be available only in sufficient quantity to supply operational units for a short period.

*B-52 airborne alert

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US

The Army has prepositioned in Europe sufficient equipment for one infantry and one armored division and minimum essential supporting troops. In addition, sufficient supplies to support these elements in combat for approximately 60 days have been pre-stocked in Europe. As a part of the Berlin buildup, Department of the Army also deployed approximately 18,200 troops in 89 support type units and about 8,200 men to fill up logistic support units that were understrength in Europe. The Navy increased its mobile logistic support capability by addition of 11 logistic support ships, added one Fleet Ballistic Missile submarine tender, established FBM logistic support facilities at Holy Loch, and will add 2 FBM logistic support ships in FY 63. There has been a general increase in CONUS Polaris support arrangements. The Air Force increased stocks of conventional war supplies in Europe for all tactical air forces assigned to Europe plus 25 Federalized Air National Guard Squadrons. Production of modern conventional ordnance has been accelerated to further improve the conventional war capability of the Air Forces. The Marines have modernized tanks, flame throwers and track landing vehicles as well as adding additional mobilization reserve material to their war stocks.

TROOP REPOSITIONING

Soviet

No major repositioning of troops apparent during the period.

US

The armed forces sent 62,000 additional personnel to Europe. The Army mechanized three infantry divisions, brought up to strength units stationed in Europe, shipped 89 units of various sizes to Europe, moved the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment to Europe and conducted the LONG THRUST series of exercises which stationed two battle groups in Europe on a rotational basis. The Air Force initially moved seven tactical fighter squadrons to Europe which were later replaced by 11 air guard squadrons, supporting units, and 1 tactical control group. This was a net increase of 124 TAC aircraft in Europe. The B-47s at 10 UK and Moroccan bases were increased from a total of 60 in July 1961 to 136 by September 1961. The Navy re-positioned one HUK group to the eastern North Atlantic.

TRAINING

Soviet

Moscow announced that military exercises using advanced modern weapons would be conducted and that the Warsaw Pact had agreed to work out practical measures to strengthen Bloc defenses. Toward this end, the USSR and Eastern European Satellites raised manning levels and in early October held a Warsaw Pact command post exercise.

Warsaw Pact Naval exercises were conducted in the Baltic in February 1962, with the USSR, Poland and East Germany participating.

Fighter aircraft have been observed in maneuvers in East Germany which are believed to have been related to the delivery of nuclear weapons.

US

Numerous exercises stressing combat readiness have been held by the armed forces during the past 18 months. These included participation in normal NATO exercises, the LONG THRUST deployment series of exercises sponsored by NATO, joint exercises in which the Services combine to maintain their readiness for joint action, and unilateral exercises and maneuvers stressing mobility, climatic conditions, rapid reaction and counterinsurgency training. The Army relieved two divisions of their basic training mission. The Navy increased participation in combined, joint and unilateral exercises with stepped up individual ship training for systems such as SAMS (surface-to-air missiles), NTDS (Naval Tactical Display System) and Polaris.